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THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND IRAQ:
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY IN ACTION
Fahad Siddiqui*

Following the invasion of Iraq, the American-run Coalition Provisional
Authority (“CPA”) introduced a series of Orders and Regulations that
restructured the foreign investment landscape in that country. Some of these
regulations, and the political story behind their implementation, have
received scholarly attention. However, few commentators have analyzed the
body of CPA-issued regulations for provisions relevant to foreign investment.
This paper traces the evolution of investment law in occupied Iraq through a
detailed evaluation of CPA-issued Orders and Regulations. Analysis of these
regulations, of pre-existing US policy on foreign investment, and of criteria
used to measure foreign investment regulation reveals the extent to which
the CPA regime installed in Iraq is intensely pro-foreign investor and reflects
a policy commitment to opening developing markets to foreign investment.
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INTRODUCTION
As early as 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United
States (“NSS”) proclaimed the promotion of economic freedom
“beyond America’s shores” as a pillar of its defense policy. Specifically,
the US asserted that it would engage with other countries to promote
“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business
investment.”277 Following the invasion of Iraq, the American-run
Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) introduced a series of Orders
and Regulations that restructured the foreign investment landscape in
that country. Some of these laws, and the political story behind their
implementation, have received scholarly attention.278 However, few
commentators have analyzed the body of CPA-issued regulations for
provisions relevant to foreign investment.
This paper traces the evolution of investment law in occupied
Iraq through a detailed analysis of CPA-issued Orders and
Regulations. I argue that the legal regime installed in this period is
pro-foreign investor and reflects a US policy commitment to opening
developing markets to foreign investment. Part One lays out the
policy context in which the CPA operated. Part Two illustrates the
investment picture established through CPA laws on deBa’athification, tax, immunities, and foreign investment. Part Three
compares the CPA investment scheme with pre-invasion US policy
and addresses the international law of occupation. Part Four tests the
extent to which the package of incentives and restrictions contained
in CPA-issued laws represent an investor-friendly scheme using three
measures of the treatment of foreign investment.
It is worth noting that there may be some debate as to
whether non-Iraqi companies contracted to provide services in Iraq
should be considered foreign investors.279 However, the CPA, which
“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, The White
House (September 2002) at 17 [NSS].
278 See e.g. Nicole Marie Crum, “Liberalization or Economic Colonization: The
Legality of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Structural Investment Law Reforms
in Post-Conflict Iraq” (2005) 2 South Carolina Journal of International Law and
Business 49; See also Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster
Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).
279 See, e.g. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford:
2007, Oxford University Press) at 73-80.
277
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was the body that concluded agreements with foreign contractors on
behalf of Iraq, came to define “foreign investment” as “investment in
any kind of asset in Iraq” including “technical expertise.”280
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
jurisprudence also supports the position that contracts for the
provision of services constitute international investments, so long as
the contracting party has made contributions in the host country that
are certain in duration, of economic value (such as labour and
services), and involve some risk for the contractor.281 For the purposes
of this paper, it is assumed on that basis that foreign contractors
providing services in Iraq constitute foreign investors.
1. THE POLICY CONTEXT
A brief review of US policy on international investment will
help set the context in which the CPA operated. Before the invasion
of Iraq, the White House established the liberalization of investment
law in developing markets as a pillar of US defense policy. The US
State Department agreed and made recommendations on how to
implement this policy in Iraq. Both sets of documents are reviewed
below.

1.1 International Investment and US Foreign Policy before the
Occupation of Iraq
The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of the
United States of 2002 has featured prominently in political and legal
scholarship because of its articulation of the doctrine of preemptive
self-defense.282 However, another defense policy commitment
articulated in that White House-issued document has proven
extremely relevant for Iraq: promoting law reform in emerging
markets to encourage international flows of investment capital. “The
lessons of history are clear,” the NSS proclaims, “market economies …
Order Number 39 (Foreign Investment), Coalition Provisional Authority (19
September 2003), s 1(3) [Order 39].
281 See e.g. L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v Republique Algerienne Democratique
et Populaire (2006), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes).
282 See e.g., Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships” (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 22.
280
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are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.”283 The
organizing principle would be “a world in which all countries have
investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access to
international capital markets and to invest in their future.”284 One of
the featured methods of achieving this goal was the promotion of
“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business
investment” and “tax policies—particularly lower marginal tax rates—
that improve incentives for work and investment.”285 International
investment was seen as one of the primary means of encouraging
development, which, in turn, would encourage stability and enhance
US security. The importance of international investment to US
defense policy was thus identified before the invasion of Iraq: “Free
markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security
strategy.”286
This position was echoed by a collection of several hundred
government officials and Iraqi exiles gathered by the US State
Department to form The Future of Iraq Project (“FIP”). Between July
2002 and April 2003, the group held dozens of meetings to discuss the
needs of post-invasion Iraq.287 The subject-specific working group
reports, completed in 2003 and declassified in 2005, are consistent in
their support for reducing barriers to foreign investment in Iraq. For
example, the Oil and Energy Working Group report asserts that
“Iraq’s economy upon liberation will be in need of billions of dollars
of foreign direct investment” and encourages the establishment of
new “terms” and “conditions” to induce such funds.288 The Economy
and Infrastructure Working Group struck a similar tone, insisting on
“creating a favorable investment climate for foreign investors” as a
first step to encourage growth.289 International investment was seen as
the key to “invigorate Iraq’s economy and lift the Iraqi people out of a
NSS, supra note 1 at 17.
Ibid at 18.
285 Ibid at 17.
286 NSS, supra note 1 at 23.
287 Robert Bejesky, “Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market
Expectations” (2011) 63 Oklahoma Law Review 193 at 216-218.
288 “Oil & Energy Working Group: The Future of Iraq Project”, US Department of
State (2003, declassified in part on June 22, 2005) at 9 [FIP—Oil & Energy].
289 “Economy and Infrastructure (Public Finance) Working Group: The Future of Iraq
Project”, US Department of State (2003, declassified in part on June 22, 2005) at 5
[FIP—Economy & Infrastructure].
283
284
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future of impoverishment.”290 The invasion of Iraq was considered an
appropriate method to implement the necessary reforms: “regime
change provides the opportunity to liberate not only the country but
also the economy.”291 In effect, the FIP was a practical application to
Iraq of the NSS defense policy commitment to encouraging
international investment in developing economies.
2. THE COALITIONAL PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
A full picture of the legal regime governing international
investment in Iraq emerges from a detailed review of the Orders
issued by the CPA while it was in power (12 April 2003 – 28 June
2004). Few, if any studies, have examined these regulations in detail.
Although only one Order governs international investment directly
(Order 39), a number of other Orders contain provisions that are
relevant to international investors. This section focuses on regulation
in four areas. First, “De-Ba’athification” (Order 1) resulted in a purge
of many technical experts from the Iraqi public sector and created a
range of opportunities for the provision of services and expertise by
foreign investors. Second, legal immunity from US judicial process
was extended to international investors with interests in Iraqi
petroleum products (US Executive Order 13303) and to foreign
contractors operating in Iraq from Iraqi judicial process (Order 17).
Third, tax provisions (Order 37 and Order 49) protected foreign
contractors and investors in Iraq from all tax liability. And finally,
Order 39 (“Foreign Investment”) provided additional incentives
specifically designed to induce foreign investment in Iraq.
At the outset, it is worth noting that, although many CPA
Orders discussed below specify the period of time in which they
would be in force, the final Order issued before the CPA’s dissolution
and the governing document of the Iraqi Interim Government that
took the CPA’s place extended the validity of CPA provisions until
they are specifically contradicted by Iraqi law. The transition from
CPA authority to Iraqi sovereignty is discussed further at 2.5.

290
291

Ibid.
Ibid.
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2.1 De-Ba’athification and Foreign Expertise
The first Order issued by the CPA, once it assumed authority
in Iraq, mandated the removal of members of the Ba’ath Party from
public sector jobs.292 On its face, the motivation behind the move was
a concern with the re-emergence of elements of the previous regime
in the post-invasion political order.293 The Order therefore expelled
anyone holding the rank of “Regional Command Member,” “Branch
Member,” or “Section Member” in the Ba’ath Party from public
office.294 However, Order 1 also applied to “individuals holding
positions in the top three layers of management in every national
government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government
institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals).”295 Such individuals were
to be interviewed for “possible affiliation” with the Ba’ath Party. This
provision excluded both senior members of the Ba’ath Party and those
holding the more junior ranks of “Member” and “Active Member”
from management positions in the public sector.296
Targeting junior Ba’ath Party members in the public service
resulted in a “crippling” purge of management and technical
specialists from a number of ministries and public institutions.297 In
turn, the need for technical expertise throughout the Iraqi public
sector represented an opportunity for foreign investors. Three months
after Order 1 was issued, the CPA published a memorandum on
contract and grant procedures that lists “technical expertise” as one of
the factors used to evaluate prospective contractors.298 A CPA
Inspector General audit notes that offers by foreign contractors
responding to CPA-issued Requests for Proposals were evaluated
primarily on the basis of “the offerors’ experience and expertise.”299
The CPA would later include “technical expertise” in its definition of
292 Order Number 1 (De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society), Coalition Provisional
Authority (16 May 2003) [Order Number 1].
293 Ibid, s 1(1).
294 Ibid, s 1(2).
295 Ibid, s 1(3)
296 Ibid.
297 Greg Muttitt, Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Iraq (London: The Bodley Head,
2011) at 86.
298 Memorandum Number 4 (Contract and Grant Procedures), Coalition Provisional
Authority (19 August 2003), s 7(3)(c).
299 “Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts: Report Number 04-005”,
Office of the Inspector General Coalition Provisional Authority (23 July 2004) at 16.
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“foreign investment” which brought foreign experts within the ambit
of provisions designed to induce foreign investors in Iraq (discussed at
2.4).300
Consulting contracts with foreign companies were eventually
concluded in the areas of local governance, democracy building,
agriculture, banking, public health, airport and seaport
administration, education, housing, and the development of civil
society.301 Although the precise value of these contracts is unknown,
the relatively small number of Iraqis hired by the CPA to work for the
reconstruction is a reflection of the scale of the opportunity the “DeBa’athification” of Iraq represented for foreign investors.302

2.2 Immunity for Foreign Investors
The second aspect of the investment regime that warrants
scrutiny is the provision of immunity to foreign entities with interests
in Iraq. These protections granted near-total immunity to
international investors from US and Iraqi judicial process. In the early
days of the occupation (May 2003), the White House issued a
presidential Executive Order protecting international investors in
Iraqi petroleum products from judicial proceedings in the US. The
order provided immunity against “any attachment, judgment, decree,
lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process.”303 The
protection was extended to the Development Fund of Iraq and to:
all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, and interests
therein, and proceeds, obligations, or any financial
instruments of any nature whatsoever arising from or related
to the sale or marketing thereof, and interests therein, in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest, that are in the United States, that hereafter come
See the introduction for a discussion of the provision of services as international
investment.
301 See e,g Honourable Frank R. Wolf, “Remarks in the House of Representatives”
(June 10, 2003) in 149 Congressional Record Part II at 1457; See also Shane Harris,
“Outsourcing Iraq” (2004) 36 Government Executive 11.
302 Rajiv Chandasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) at 326.
303 “Executive Order Protecting the Development Fund of Iraq and Certain other
Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest (13303)”, The White House (22 May 2003), s
1.
300

90

within the United States, or that are or hereafter come
within the possession or control of United States persons.304

Because of the significance of oil to the Iraqi economy—oil represents
70 percent of Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product and 95 percent of Iraqi
government revenue—this measure appears to shield a range of
foreign investors in Iraq from judgments issued in US legal system.305
Shortly after, the CPA granted international investors broad
immunity from Iraqi law. Order 17 applies to both foreign contractors
(defined as “non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally
resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of
Coalition Forces or the CPA under contractual obligations”) and
foreign sub-contractors (defined as “non-Iraqi business entities or
individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or
services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of
Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrangements”), among
others.306 The Order provides that foreign contractors, subcontractors, and their employees are not subject to Iraqi laws or
regulations “in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their
contracts in relation to the Coalition Forces or the CPA,” for actions
with respect to “licensing and registration of employees, businesses
and corporations in relation to such contracts,” and for “acts
performed … within their official activities pursuant to the terms and
conditions of a contract … and any sub-contract thereto.”307 With
respect to actions and omissions by contractors, sub-contractors and
their employees not performed pursuant to contracts, no Iraqi legal
process could be commenced “without the written permission of the
CPA.”308 This latter provision effectively shields foreign contractors in
Iraq from Iraqi jurisdiction, subject to CPA authorization to the
contrary. These immunities were to last only for the period of
authority of the CPA, however, later provisions issued by the CPA
Ibid, s 1(a).
Daniel Behn, “Sharing Iraq’s Oil: Analyzing Production-Sharing Contracts Under
the Final Draft Petroleum Law” (2007) 4 Oil, Gas and Energy Law (no pagination in
journal).
304
305

Order Number 17 (Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their
Personnel, and Contractors), Coalition Provisional Authority (26 June 2003), s 1(3),
306

1(5).
307
308

Ibid, ss 3(1), 3(2).
Ibid, s 3(3).
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and the Iraqi interim government stipulated that CPA Orders would
remain in force unless specifically overturned by Iraqi law (discussed
at 2.5).

2.3 Limited Tax Liability for Foreign Investors
The CPA issued two tax-specific Orders, one for calendar year
2003 (Order 37) and a second for calendar year 2004 and beyond
(Order 49), both of which contain provisions relevant to international
investors. Order 37, issued on September 15, applied retroactively
from date of issuance to the whole calendar year and outlines a
number of incentives designed to attract foreign capital to postinvasion Iraq. The Order defines tax broadly as “any tax or charge
having the effect of a tax” including, without limitation, any tax or
“levy, duty, withholding, or fee.”309 It goes on to suspend all income
tax for assessed income sources enumerated in the Iraqi Income Tax
Law (113) of 1982.310 Moreover, no Iraqi tax would apply to the
contractors and sub-contractors of the CPA or to the contractors and
sub-contractors of any department or agency of Coalition Forces’
governments.311 All Iraqi law inconsistent with the Order was
suspended.312 In addition, the Order mandated that individual and
corporate income tax rate for the years following (meaning 2004 and
beyond) would not exceed 15 percent.313 Through these provisions,
foreign investors in Iraq were effectively protected from tax or other
government-imposed liabilities for 2003, and provided with a
guaranteed ceiling of 15 percent on any future tax liability in the
country. Few jurisdictions in the region offer foreign investors the
same certainty against short or medium-term encumbrances on
revenue: even though many Middle Eastern economies are ranked
amongst the lowest-taxing countries in the world, the average total
tax rate remains 25.4%.314
Order 49 for 2004 introduced a more specific tax regime while
maintaining many of the incentives for foreign investors introduced
Order Number 37 (Tax Strategy for 2003), Coalition Provisional Authority (15
September 2003).
310 Ibid, s 2(a).
311 Ibid, s 3(2).
312 Ibid, s 7.
313 Ibid, s 4.
314 “Paying Taxes 2012: The Global Picture”, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) at 82.
309
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in Order 37. The suspension of Iraqi tax laws was lifted with two
modifications to the domestic tax scheme. First, Order 49 codifies the
guarantee in Order 37 that no tax rate in the country would exceed 15
percent by introducing language to this effect in the domestic Iraqi
tax code.315 Second, foreign companies that are “registered in Iraq or
otherwise have a permanent establishment in Iraq” would enjoy a
fixed 15 percent tax rate, well below the previously established rate in
Iraq or the average rate in the region.316 The Order also grants taxexempt status to a broad range of foreign investors. Foreign
contractors and subcontractors who have concluded agreements with
the CPA, foreign countries cooperating with Coalition Forces, or
departments and agencies of Coalition Forces’ governments are
eligible for exemption from any tax “or similar charge” in Iraq.317 Any
foreign contractors “providing technical, financial, logistical,
administrative, or other assistance to Iraq” qualify for the
exemption.318 The immunity from tax liability applies to income
earned from foreign sources and from sources in Iraq, and extends to
all non-Iraqi employees of said contractors and subcontractors.319
Although issued at the end of February 2004, the Order stipulates that
its’ provisions would apply retroactively from the beginning of that
year. No end date is enumerated.
Order 49 establishes a two-tier tax system in Iraq with foreign
investors securing better than national treatment. While Iraqi entities
were liable for assessment under the reinstituted Iraqi tax scheme,
foreign contractors (and their employees) that concluded agreements
with the CPA or other governments cooperating with Coalition
Forces were guaranteed immunity from tax liability so long as they
were deemed to be providing “assistance to Iraq.” Although Iraq is not
alone in granting tax incentives to foreign investors unavailable to
national investors, Order 49 is unique in the region for immunizing
most foreign investors indefinitely from all tax liability.320

315

Order Number 49 (Tax Strategy of 2004), Coalition Provisional Authority (29

February 2004), s 3(1).
316 Ibid, s 3(3).
317 Ibid, s 4(3).
318 Ibid.
319

Ibid.

See e.g. A. Rohan Perera, “The Role and Implications of Bilateral Investment
Treaties” (2000) 26 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 607 at 621.
320
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2.4 Provisions Specific to International Investors (Order 39)
While the immunity and tax provisions issued by the CPA
provide strong incentives to foreign investors, Order 39 is the heart of
the CPA-designed foreign investment scheme in Iraq. Its provisions,
reviewed below in detail, structured the foreign investment
environment in Iraq until 2006, when the first permanent
government of Iraq passed a new investment law.
Order 39 is the only CPA-issued order that defines “foreign
investment” in post-invasion Iraqi law. “Foreign investment” is said to
include investment by a foreign investor “in any kind of asset in Iraq,
including tangible and intangible property, and related property
rights, shares and other forms of participation in a business entity, and
intellectual property rights and technical expertise…”321 The inclusion
of technical expertise brought the array of international service
providers and consultants contracted during the reconstruction period
(discussed at 2.1) under the umbrella of these foreign investment
provisions. Second, foreign investment is permitted in all regions and
economic sectors of Iraq with the exception of banking and primary
extraction and initial processing in natural resources.322 Many Iraqi
government officials assert that closing the oil and gas sector to
international investors resulted only from protests by Iraqi advisors
appointed by the CPA.323 Third, the Order purports to grant national
treatment to foreign investors, and where an international treaty
signed by Iraq provides more favorable terms for foreign investors,
those terms apply.324 It is worth recalling that the CPA-introduced
provisions granting foreign investors immunity from Iraqi law and tax
liability (discussed at 2.2 and 2.3 respectively) provided foreign
investors with privileges unavailable to national investors. Fourth, the
Order grants foreign investors broad ownership and management
rights, including the right to 100 percent ownership of Iraqi assets and
to establish wholly foreign-owned businesses in Iraq.325 Fifth, the
order permits tax-free remittances of profits earned in Iraq, including
profits from disposition of the entire foreign investment.326 Sixth, the
Order 39, supra note 4 at 1(3) (emphasis mine).
Ibid at 6(1).
323 Klein, supra note 2 at 361.
324 Order 39, supra note 4, ss 4(1), 14.
325 Ibid, ss 7(1)(a), 7(2)(b).
326 Order 39, supra note 4, s 7(2)(d)(i).
321
322
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Order prohibits foreign ownership of real property, but permits the
assignment of licenses to use such property for 40-year terms.327
Seventh, foreign investors have the option to designate the dispute
settlement mechanism of their choice in any contract concluded with
Iraqi entities, including international arbitration.328 Because the Order
holds that all conflicting legal texts are deemed to be void and that
dispute settlement mechanisms under Iraqi law are optional, the
Order appears to limit resort to domestic Iraqi remedies unless a
foreign investor and local entity agree to this option in writing.329
Finally, the Order purports to replace all existing foreign investment
law in Iraq, which underscores the sweeping nature of the reforms it
introduced.330

2.5 The CPA Investment Regime after Occupation
The regime discussed above continued to influence the foreign
investment climate in Iraq beyond the dissolution of the CPA on 28
June 2004. The final order issued by the CPA stipulated that antiBa’ath, tax, and foreign investment provisions would remain in force
“unless and until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted
and having the force of law…”331 The CPA also revised Order 17 to
ensure that foreign contractors would continue to enjoy immunity in
matters relating to their contracts, duty-free imports and exports, and
exemptions from Iraqi tax on local purchases and income earned in
Iraq “until the departure of the final element of the [Multi-National
Force] from Iraq, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly
enacted and having the force of law.”332 Through a combination of UN
Security Council resolutions recognizing the interim Iraqi
government that succeeded the CPA and provisions in the
concomitant interim Iraqi constitution, the CPA’s extension of the
applicability of regulations it had issued beyond its dissolution was
Ibid, ss 8(1) and 8(2).
Ibid, s 10.
329 Ibid, ss 10, 13.
330 Ibid, s 3(1).
331 Order Number 100: Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (28 June 2004) at preamble.
332 Order Number 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNFIraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority (June
327
328

27, 2004), ss 4, 8(a), 8(b), 10, 20.
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confirmed in international and Iraqi law.333
Many incentives foreign investors enjoyed under the CPA
investment scheme were also either continued or broadened under
the Iraqi investment law that eventually replaced Order 39 in 2006. 334
That law guaranteed national treatment of foreign investors,
permitted 100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi assets, allowed for
international arbitration, and provided a range of exemptions from tax
and import / export fees.335 Unlike the CPA scheme, the Iraqi law that
replaced Order 39 permitted both foreign ownership of Iraqi land for
the purpose of executing housing projects, and foreign leasing of lands
for 50-year terms with the possibility of renewal, which is 10 years
more than was permitted under CPA regulations.336
3. ASSESSING THE CPA INVESTMENT SCHEME: US POLICY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The CPA investment scheme is now compared to US policy
pronouncements to test the extent to which it reflects ideological
commitments articulated before the war (discussed at 1.1). This
section also introduces the question of whether the CPA had the legal
authority to reform Iraqi investment law in the manner and to the
extent that it did (at 3.2).

3.1 Order 39 and US Foreign Policy
As early as 2002, US policy was committed to the view that
Resolution 1511 (2003), UNSC, 2003, S/RES/1511; Resolution 1546 (2004), UNSC,
2004, S/RES/1546; Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period, Iraqi Governing Council (in force 28 June 2004), s 26(c). The arrangements
relating to legal immunities were eventually superseded by the 2008 US—Iraq Status
of Forces Agreement that maintained the immunity of US forces acting in their
official capacity from Iraqi legal procedure, but established Iraqi jurisdiction over US
contractors operating in Iraq. See Agreement Between the United States of America
333

and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, 17
November 2008, Article 12 (Jurisdiction).
334

Law No (13) of 2006: The Investment Law, Republic of Iraq (2006) as amended in

2010 [Law No (13)].
335 Ibid, ss 10(1), 10(3)(c), 15, 27, 17.
336 Ibid, ss 10(2), 10(3)(a).
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international investment was a key to development. “Market
economies” were seen as the “best way to promote prosperity and
reduce poverty” and foreign investment was necessary to “invigorate
Iraq’s economy and lift the Iraqi people out of a future of
impoverishment.”337 The opening words of Order 39 demonstrate
how the CPA applied these commitments to law reform in Iraq:
“Determined to improve the conditions of life, technical skills, and
opportunities for all Iraqis and to fight unemployment with its
associated deleterious effect on public security…”338
The CPA investment regime also reflects more specific
assertions by the US State Department that Iraq’s infrastructure “upon
liberation will be in need of billions of dollars of foreign direct
investment” and that “creating a favorable investment climate for
foreign investors” would be a necessary first step.339 Order 39 declares
that “facilitating foreign investment will help to develop
infrastructure, foster the growth of Iraqi business, create jobs, raise
capital, result in the introduction of new technology into Iraq and
promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to Iraqis…”340 Most
significantly, the US pledge to promote liberal investment laws in host
states—“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies”—is clearly
reflected in Order 39:
This Order promotes and safeguards the general welfare and
interests of the Iraqi people by promoting foreign
investment through the protection of the rights and property
of foreign investors in Iraq and the regulation through
transparent processes of matters relating to foreign
investment in Iraq. This Order specifies the terms and
procedures for making foreign investments and is intended
to attract new foreign investment to Iraq.341

Order 39 thereby mirrors a pre-invasion US policy commitment to
encourage foreign investment in developing economies through law
reform.

NSS, supra note 1 at 17; FIP—Economy & Infrastructure, supra note 13 at 5.
Order 39, supra note 4 at preamble.
339 FIP—Oil & Energy, supra note 12 at 9; FIP—Economy & Infrastructure, supra note
13 at 5.
340 NSS, supra note 1 at 17.
341 Order 39, supra note 4, s 2.
337
338
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3.2 CPA Reforms and International Law
The manner in, and extent to which, the CPA reformed Iraqi
investment law may have been in contravention of international law.
Although a conclusive determination of whether the CPA had the
authority under international law to introduce the regulations
discussed in Part 2 is beyond the scope of this paper, the question may
be of interest to both foreign investors and the state of Iraq, and either
may wish to seek remedies for investment agreements concluded in
this period.
The parameters for the exercise of authority by occupying
forces in Iraq are grounded in Security Council Resolutions and
international humanitarian law. There appears to be consensus among
the small number of scholars who have analyzed this issue that the
CPA exercised authority pursuant to, and within the boundaries of,
applicable international humanitarian law, customary international
law and relevant Security Council resolutions.342 The CPA itself
claimed the authority to govern occupied Iraq on the basis of Security
Council resolutions and the laws of war. Regulation Number 1 asserts
that the CPA exercises authority “under relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), and
the laws and usages of war.”343 All CPA Orders begin with a similar
declaration in the name of Paul Bremer, Administrator of the CPA.
Order 1, for example, opens with the following: “Pursuant to my
authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the laws and
usages of war …”344
Although similar provisions from other Orders do not include
the reference to “the laws and usages of war,” all CPA orders refer
either to “relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions” or to Resolution
1483. This resolution, which predates all but the first CPA Order and
Regulation, refers to the CPA as the unified command of the
“occupying powers” and calls for the CPA to “comply fully with [its]
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”345 The CPA

See e.g. Crum, supra note 2.
Regulation Number 1, Coalition Provisional Authority (16 May 2003), s 1(2).
344 Order 1, supra note 16 at preamble.
345 Resolution 1483 (2003), UNSC, 2003, S/RES/1483 at preamble, 5 [Resolution 1483].
342
343

98

therefore appears bound as an occupying power by applicable
international humanitarian law irrespective of whether its Orders and
Regulations refer explicitly to “the laws and usages of war.”
International law constrained the CPA’s ability to issue
investment laws. For example, Resolution 1483 and the fourth Hague
Convention of 1907 [Hague IV] limit the authority of occupying
powers to alter the legal framework of the jurisdiction being
occupied.346 Article 43 notes that once an occupier assumes authority,
it “shall take all the measures in his [sic] power to restore, and ensure,
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”347 Similarly,
operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 1483 calls on the CPA to work
towards “the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can
freely determine their own political future.”348 These provisions
appear to limit CPA authority with respect to international
investment in three ways. First, the CPA could not alter domestic
Iraqi law unless absolutely prevented from doing so. Second, any such
changes would have to be made in accordance with Iraqi law already
in force.349 And third, the CPA would arguably be barred from issuing
provisions on international investment (such as guarantees against
expropriation) if this would limit the purview of future Iraqi
governments to “freely determine their own political future.”

Hague IV and Resolution 1483 also appear to limit the
exercise of CPA authority by circumscribing the permissible uses of
Iraqi assets. Article 55 of Hague IV limits the use of “public buildings,
real estate, forests, and agricultural assets” in the occupied country by
requiring the occupying power to “safeguard the capital of these
properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of
usufruct.”350 Similarly, Resolution 1483 calls on the CPA to “promote
the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of
the territory.”351 It appears that the CPA was, therefore, limited in its
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, International
Conferences (The Hague) 18 October 1907 [Hague Convention IV].
347 Ibid at article 43 (emphasis mine).
348 Resolution 1483 supra note 70 at 4.
349 Crum, supra note 2 at 72, 115.
350 Hague Convention IV, supra note 71 at 55.
351 Resolution 1483, supra note 70 at 4.
346

99

ability to enter into agreements with foreign investors that would
result in Iraqi state assets being disposed of in a manner not in the best
interest or for the welfare of Iraqis.
Whether the CPA violated international law either by
reforming Iraqi investment law in the manner or to the extent that it
did, or by concluding agreements under those investment laws that
disposed of Iraqi assets improperly is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, because of the potential implications for foreign investors
and for the state of Iraq, the question warrants further study.
4. ASSESSING THE CPA INVESTMENT SCHEME: THREE
FRAMEWORKS
The combination of CPA tax, immunity, and foreign
investment provisions presented a number of incentives for, and few
restrictions on, foreign investment in post-invasion Iraq. However,
analysis of the CPA investment scheme to date has either been
general and categorical (“an anti-Marshall Plan”) or limited to a
particular CPA Order.352 Few if any studies have assessed the CPA
investment scheme as a whole or with reference to objective criteria.
Three frameworks of analysis prove useful in this regard: the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)
framework on “host country operational measures” (“HCOMs”); the
UNCTAD framework on foreign investment policy instruments
(“PIs”); and the World Bank International Finance Corporation
(“World Bank”) framework for investment law reform. The goal of
this part of the paper is to test objectively the extent to which CPAissued regulations on foreign investment represent a pro-investor legal
regime.

4.1 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Host Country
Operational Measures Framework
The CPA-instituted foreign investment scheme ranks among
the most investor-friendly possible according to the UNCTAD
Klein, supra note 2 at 347; See e.g. Crum, supra note 2; See also Clarence M. Dass,
“Adventure Capitalizing in Baghdad: An Entrepreneurial Approach to Reconstructing
Iraq” (2009) 4 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 157.
352
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categorization of HCOMs.353 The HCOM framework evaluates
measures that target international investment directly through
restrictions or performance requirements. “Red light” HCOMs,
including local content or trade-balancing requirements, foreign
exchange restrictions, or export controls are considered the most
restrictive and the least foreign investor-friendly.354 The CPA issued
no such restrictions or requirements. “Yellow light” or intermediate
category HCOMs include common requirements or standards imposed
on foreign investment.355 As Table 1 below demonstrates, the CPA
investment scheme contains none of these typical requirements or
standards:

“The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives”,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4
(2003) at 6 [UNCTAD Development].
354 Ibid at 5.
355 Ibid.
353
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Table 1: CPA Investment Scheme and Typical Host Country
Operational Measures
“Yellow Light” Host Country Operational
Measures356
-Requirements to locate headquarters for a specific
region
-Employment performance requirements
-Export performance requirements
-Restrictions on sales of goods or services in the
territory where produced or provided
-Requirements to supply goods or services to specific
region exclusively from a territory
-Requirements to act as the sole supplier of goods
produced or services provided
-Requirements to transfer technology, production
processes or other proprietary knowledge
-Research and development requirements
-Measures contrary to the principle of fair and
equitable treatment
-Requirements to establish a joint venture with
domestic participation
-Requirements for a minimum level of domestic
equity participation

CPA Investment
Scheme (Orders 17,
37, 39, 49)
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No (better of national
or other treatment
provided by treaty)
No (full foreign
ownership permitted)
No (full foreign
ownership permitted)

All measures not categorized as “red light” or “yellow light”
HCOMs fall into the “green light” category. The right of host
countries to impose such measures is uncontested in international
investment agreements.357 However, the CPA scheme includes only
one “green light” HCOM: a prohibition on foreign investment in the
banking and hydrocarbon sectors.358 As discussed above (at 2.4), this
measure was only introduced as a result of Iraqi pressure on the CPA.
In sum, the HCOM framework demonstrates the extent to which the
CPA investment scheme is pro-foreign investor: it includes no “red
All “‘Yellow Light’ Host Country Operational Measures” from UNCTAD
Development, supra note 78 at 6.
357 “Host Country Operational Measures”, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/26 (2001) at 48.
358 Order 39, supra note 4, s 6(1).
356
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light” or “yellow light” restrictions typically imposed on foreign
investment, and the sole “green light” restriction it does include was
not a CPA initiative.

4.2 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Policy Instruments
Framework
The CPA-instituted foreign investment scheme also rates
among the most investor-friendly according to the UNCTAD
framework on foreign investment PIs. Unlike the HCOM framework
that focuses only on restrictions and performance requirements, the
foreign investment PI analysis considers all regulatory and incentive
measures relevant to foreign investment. As Table 2 below shows,
CPA PIs contain only two regulatory measures among those typically
available to policy makers: restrictions on foreign investment in
banking and hydrocarbons, and limitations of foreign land ownership.
However, as discussed above, the former was not part of the initial
foreign investment scheme and was introduced only at the insistence
of the CPA’s Iraqi advisors; the latter is mitigated by the fact that
Order 39 authorizes the leasing of Iraqi land to foreign investors for
up to 40 years with the possibility of renewal. At the same time, CPA
PIs provide many of the fiscal, financial, and other incentive measures
available to policy makers. The PI analysis therefore also demonstrates
the extent to which the CPA investment scheme is intensely proforeign investor.
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Table 2: CPA Investment Scheme and Typical Foreign Investment Regulatory Measures and Incentives
Admission and Establishment Regulatory Measures359
Possible Measures
-Restrictions on numbers of multinationals
-Minimum capital requirements
-Subsequent additional capital inputs
-Screening, authorization, registration
-Entry conditions – Meeting criteria
(environment)
-Legal form requirements of FDI
-Restrictions on entry modalities
-Special requirements for non-equity
-FDI to specific locations (moderate urban
drift)
-Restrictions of imported input factors
-Deposit requirements prior to FDI
-Admission to hosts privatization deals
restricted
-Admission and incorporation fees (taxes)
-Compliances with norms (customs, public
morals)
-Sectors ring-fenced from FDI

CPA Investment
Scheme
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes (banking,
hydrocarbons)

Ownership and Control Regulatory Measures
Possible Measures
-Equity limits on foreign ownership (e.g. less
than 50 per cent)
-Mandatory transfer of ownership
-Nationality limitation on equity held
-Restrictions on foreign loans (bonds)
-Restrictions on stocks and share types held
by foreign investor
-Restrictions on types of share transfers
-Restrictions on foreign share holders
(dividend, capital)
-‘Golden’ shares held by host
-Government appoint reservations to board
-Restrictions on nationality of directors
-Government reserves right to veto certain
decisions
-Government reserves rights to be consulted
prior to decisions
-Restrictions on land rights transfers

CPA Investment
Scheme
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes (no foreign
ownership of land, 40year leases only)

359 All “possible measures” from “FDI Policy Instruments: Advantages and Disadvantages”, United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
Research and Statistics Branch Working Paper 01/2009 (2009) at 20.
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Operations Regulatory Measures
Possible Measures
-Employment restrictions on foreign staff
-Performance requirements (local
sourcing, employment, training)
-Import, export, sales, foreign exchange
earnings
-Restrictions on public procurement
-Restricted access to local factors inputs
-Restrictions on diversification, on access
to communications
-Restrictions on free flow of government
data
-Operation restriction on public utilities
-Restrictions on access to local credit
-Restrictions on foreign exchange, capital
repatriation
-“Cultural” restrictions
-Information disclosure requirements
-Operational permits / licenses, technical
standards, royalty ceilings
-Advertising restrictions on foreign
multinationals
-Special restrictions on sector operations
(banks)

CPA Investment
Scheme
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes (banking,
hydrocarbons)

Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Measures
Possible Measures
Fiscal Incentives
-Losses against future profits
-Accelerated capital depreciation
-Investment / Reinvestment permits
-Lower social security payments
-Tax reductions based on staff and
marketing expenses
-Import-based incentives (duty exemptions)
-Export-based incentives (duty exemptions)
-Reductions in corporate tax rates &
holidays
Financial Incentives
-Loan guarantees and public venture capital
availabilities
-Guaranteed export credits and Government
insurance
-Direct subsidies and subsidized loans
Other Incentives
-Subsidized dedicated infrastructure,
services, government contracts
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CPA Investment
Scheme
Yes
Yes
(not addressed)
Yes (none)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes (max15%) / No
contractor tax
No
Available
No

Yes

4.3 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Investment Law
Reform Framework
Evaluating the CPA investment scheme according to the
World Bank framework for investment law reform yields a similar
result. The Bank’s blueprint for domestic investment laws is designed
to attract foreign investment:
As stated above, conducive investment policies are those
that support and enable private investment, including
foreign investment. They ensure ease of market entry and
exit and access to inputs investors need. They impose few
restrictions on sectors in which investors can invest, how
they can invest, and how much they can invest.1

As Table 3 below shows, the CPA investment scheme includes all of
the substantive and nonsubstantive qualities advocated for by the
Bank for inclusion in investment codes designed to attract foreign
investment. On flexibility in investor entry, the Bank notes that none
of the world’s largest foreign investment recipients has “a completely
open entry regime.”2 However, “the ideal framework is a liberal entry
regime” with no minimum capital requirements for investors.3 The
CPA investment scheme contains no such requirements. On investors’
rights and guarantees, the Bank assets that “most investors expect a
country to guarantee them, at a minimum, the rights and protections
listed below.”4 The CPA investment scheme guarantees foreign
investors all of the rights and protections outlined by the Bank.
Finally, the Bank argues that “good investment policies” are
characterized by clarity, stability, and transparency as defined by the
Bank. The CPA investment scheme also reflects these features. In
short, the CPA-installed investment scheme includes all of the
features that are advocated for by the World Bank into domestic law
and more closely resembles the Bank’s ideal “liberal entry regime”
than any of the world’s largest recipients of foreign investment.

“Investment Law Reform: A Handbook for Development Practitioners”, Investment
Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group (June 2010) at 8 [World Bank].
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
1
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Table 3: CPA Investment Scheme and World Bank Guidelines for
Investment Law
CPA Investment Scheme

World Bank Guidelines on Best Practices for
Investment Law to Promote Investment and
Protect Investors5

Substantive Qualities of Conducive Policies
Flexibility in Investor Entry
-No mandatory minimum capital requirement for
investors

Yes

-No requirement for governmental institutional
screen in foreign investment

Yes

Investors’ Rights and Guarantees
-Nondiscrimination (national or equal treatment)

Yes (national or treaty
treatment)

-Right to ownership

Yes (full foreign
ownership)

-Convertibility and repatriation of capital and
earnings

Yes (full repatriation of
profit)

-Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms

Yes (up to contracting
parties)

-Expatriate labour

Yes (no local
employment req’d)

-Security of investment (no arbitrary
nationalization or unlawful expropriation or
confiscation)

Constructive (Order 39
protects investments and
overrules any conflicting
law; the Iraqi
constitution of 2006
guarantees against
expropriation)

5

All “guidelines” from World Bank, supra note 85 at 8-10.
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Nonsubstantive Qualities of Conducive Policies
Transparency
-Public documentation of investment laws

Yes

-Nondiscretionary—decisions made on objective
criteria

Yes

Clarity
-Simply stated so understandable by everyone

Yes

-Unambiguous language to avoid disputes

Yes

Stability
-Predictable (avoid jeopardizing legitimate
expectations)

Yes (fixed by transitional
laws)

-Comprehensive and complete to avoid
“surprises”

Yes (replaces all
conflicting law)

Evaluating CPA provisions on tax, immunities, and foreign
investment using these three frameworks confirms that the CPA
introduced a highly pro-foreign investor legal regime in post-invasion
Iraq. The UNCTAD and World Bank criteria also show how foreign
investors in post-invasion Iraq faced few of the typical restrictions on
foreign investment while benefitting from a broad range of incentive
measures.
CONCLUSION
A detailed analysis of CPA Orders on de-Ba’athification,
immunities, tax, and foreign investment demonstrates the extent to
which the CPA introduced a highly pro-investor legal regime in Iraq
starting in 2003, as hypothesized. Applying the UNCTAD and World
Bank frameworks for assessing host country foreign investment
policies and laws, it is difficult to imagine a more investor-friendly
collection of incentives and restrictions than those issued by the CPA.
This appears to validate the common perception, although not based
on a detailed analysis of CPA regulations, that Iraqi investment law in
this period embodied “the kind of wish-list that foreign investors and
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donor agencies dream of for developing markets.”6
Much of the legal regime governing foreign investment in Iraq
remains to be explored. For example, the manner in and extent to
which the CPA reformed Iraqi investment law may not have been
authorized by international law. A finding of illegality would have
significant implications for foreign investors who concluded contracts
under the CPA regime and the Iraqi state. Moreover, the current
regulations on foreign investment in Iraq remain understudied. This
paper hopes to contribute to future study by establishing a detailed
picture of the legal regime governing foreign investment in Iraq
installed in the aftermath of the invasion of 2003.

6

“Let’s All Go to the Yard Sale”, The Economist (25 September 2003).
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